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Epistemic Uncertainties in Climate Predictions.
A Challenge for Practical Decision Making
by Prof. Dr. Dr. Rafaela Hillerbrand1
bstract: Most scientists agree that, at
least for the time being, unquanti-
fied uncertainties are inevitably con-
nected to predictions of climate models.
Uncertainties, however, do not justify political
inaction. This paper addresses the question of
how epistemic uncertainties are of relevance for
practical decision making. It is shown how
common decision approaches based on the pre-
cautionary principle fail to adequately deal
with uncertainties as they arise in climate mod-
eling. I argue that with regards to climate
change, unquantified uncertainties can neither
be ignored in decision making nor be reduced
to quantified ones by assigning subjective prob-
abilities.This distinguishes the ethical problems
associated with climate change from other prob-
lems regarding energy supply and demand like,
for example, those associated with nuclear
power.
Introduction
The uncertainty of climate predictions is dis-
cussed intensively within the scientific com-
munity – not only among climate sceptics.
However, uncertainties are often kept under
wraps when scientific findings are commu-
nicated to the public.2 It is not the scientists
who are to blame here. Rather the practical
debate seems incapable of adequately reflect-
ing uncertainties in modeling predictions. If
these uncertainties were communicated,
sound scientific research runs the risk of
being discredited as unscientific; the public
seems to prefer black and white instead of
the scientists' shades of grey. Often predic-
tions are taken either as correct and unques-
tionably reliable or simply as wrong.
However, most scientific models are neither
true, in the sense that they exactly predict
future events, nor simply wrong and use-
less.3 It is argued in this paper that in order
to incorporate aspects of inter- and intragen-
erational justice, practical decision making
has to carefully consider the shades of grey
A
Wirth, David A. / Lashof, Daniel A. (1990):
Beyond Vienna and Montreal. Multilateral
Agreements on Greenhouse Gases. In:
Ambio. Vol. 19 (6-7/1990,), 305-310.
WRI (World Resources Institute) (2009):
Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT)
Version 6.0. http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?
page=yearly. Viewed June 6 2009
Submitted:11 June 2009
Accepted: 24 August 2009
Christoph Lumer is
professor of moral phi-
losophy at the Univer-
sity of Siena (Italy).
His main fields of
research are: general
and applied ethics (in
particular: justice; en-
vironmental, future and developmental
ethics), theory of action, of rational action,
of the good life and of argumentation.
Contact Details:
Università degli Studi di Siena, Diparti-
mento di Filosofia, Via Roma, 47, I-53100
Siena
E-mail: lumer@unisi.it
Web: www.unisi.it/ricerca/dip/fil_sc_soc/
lumer.htm
95
that aﬀect the reliability of climate models
in practical decision making.4
The focus here is not on the question of how
much, if any, reduction of greenhouse gases
is ethically legitimate,5 but rather on what
kind of decision making criteria should
guide our reasoning about this very que-
stion. The aim of the paper is twofold:
Firstly, I contend that some of the uncer-
tainties that practical decision making has to
consider cannot be quantified. Secondly, it is
argued that common decision making ap-
proaches based on the precautionary princi-
ple and expected utility maximisation fail to
adequately deal with unquantified uncer-
tainties and therefore are unable to incorpo-
rate issues of intergenerational or inter-
national justice.
The second section shows that any ethical
evaluation of greenhouse gas emissions has
to deal with epistemic uncertainties that
comprise, but go well beyond, what clima-
tologists refer to as uncertainty. Most pres-
sing for practical evaluations is the fact that
this auxiliar uncertainty is not quantified. I
argue in the third section that discerning
quantified and unquantified uncertainties is
relevant for practical decision making.The
fourth section contends that the precaution-
ary principle is not capable of adequately
implementing questions of fairness between
diﬀerent nations or generations. The fifth
section sketches briefly why, for the climate
debate, expected utility maximization does
not provide a more rational decision criteria
than the precautionary principle. As an out-
look, a way to modify expected utility
maximization in view of unquantified un-
certainties is adumbrated.
What is uncertain about climate predic-
tions?
Climate change raises serious problems re-
garding considerations of inter- and intrage-
nerational justice.This paper focuses on the
former and restricts itself to the ethical is-
sues associated with climate change insofar
as they are related to the distribution of wel-
fare across diﬀerent generations. Presup-
posing that our interest in the ethical aspects
of climate change arises mainly from consid-
erations of intergenerational justice, we may
assume that we value a certain ‘state of the
climate system’ only because of its value for
future generations.Then a mere rise in glo-
bal mean temperature is not morally relevant
per se. What actually matters is how changes
in mean temperature or other climatic
variables influence the living conditions of
present and future human beings.6 Quite
often, however, the discussion is cut short
and moral conclusions are derived directly
from climate-model predictions, which
merely determine the state of the climate
system. Unless one assigns an absolute value
to the climate system, there is, however, no
a priori obligation to maintain the climate
system in a particular state.This preempting
of the moral debate is not only at variance
with sound decision making, it also adversely
aﬀects the science itself as scientific reason-
ing is, mostly implicitly, accused of being
but a political instrument for the wrong
side.7
The direct and indirect influences of climate
change on the expectancy and quality of
human life cannot be determined straight-
forwardly; hence so-called impact models
are used by (welfare) economists.The three-
fold distinction between a scenario, an
earth-scientific, and an economic level intro-
duced in figure 1 helps to clarify where and
how epistemic uncertainties arise and how
they enter the practical discourse.8 Only
some of the uncertainties in climate model-
ing (level two) may be quantified in a mean-
ingful way, e.g. in terms of the width of the
probability distribution of, say, a change in
global mean temperature.These quantifiable
uncertainties mainly correspond to un-
known parameter ranges, while unquanti-
fied uncertainties remain.This is particularly
(but not exclusively) because on the first and
third level in figure 1 it is not known how
adequately the models used represent the re-
levant causal mechanisms of the modeled sy-
stem. This uncertainty in the model
conceptualization may be due to finite com-
putational power or due to our insuﬃcient
understanding of the modeled processes.
Note that in practice, the distribution of the
various tasks in determining the eﬀects of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is
not as clear-cut as suggested by figure 1, par-
ticularly when impact models mix with nor-
mative assessment.This is, on the one hand,
unavoidable and even necessary: Only a nor-
mative evaluation can determine which
aspects of human life are worth modeling.
Some modeling assumptions, like the dis-
counting rate of non-monetary losses, have
to be considered (also) on moral grounds.9
On the other hand, merging normative and
descriptive assessments blurs many (norma-
tive) assumptions and makes the evaluation
rather opaque.
The immediacy and practical relevance of
uncertainties
Why worry about epistemic problems when
reasoning about issues of inter- and intra-
generational justice? If uncertainty is a serious
problem, why not simply wait until climate
models and global and long-term economic
predictions have overcome their teething
troubles?The climate system only reacts very
slowly to changes in its parameters, such as
changes in carbon dioxide contraction.
Hence the atmospheric
concentration of persistent
greenhouse gases like carbon
dioxide can only be stabi-
lized by reducing emis-
sions.10 The large inertia of
the climate system necessita-
tes timely countermeasures.
Once particular eﬀects
occur, it may well be too late
for a systematic response.
Note again that this paper
deals with a sound discourse
about how to react to cli-
mate change, not with the
issue of correct reduction or
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Figure 1: ‘Estimating the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions on human wellbeing.’
Short straight double arrows correspond to 'yields the output', long oblique thick arrows correspond
to ‘is input for’.The dotted rectangle indicates the combination of scientific prognoses that, as a
whole, serve as the empirical input for a political or moral evaluation on the last line.
mitigation strategies.The practical discourse
may or may not come to the conclusion that
instead of mitigating now, we should wait
and adapt later. However this decision can-
not wait for better and less uncertain pre-
dictions: it has to be taken now.
A need to address epistemic uncertainties in
practical debates can be deduced from three
(fairly weak) assumptions: Firstly, practical
decision making has to be based on the best
(empirical) knowledge available. Secondly,
practical problems related to environmental
issues can be formulated as scientific prob-
lems.Thirdly, science gives us the most reli-
able understanding of the natural world. I
do not want to justify these suppositions, as
all three seem to be both weak and rather in-
tuitive. From these epistemic and practical
assumptions it follows that we have to con-
sider epistemic uncertainties in practical
decision making: The best available infor-
mation that we have today is our scientific
forecasts plus information on their reliabil-
ity.Though the latter may not be expressed
or even be able to be expressed in numeric
terms, information on the quality of various
climate predictions is available.
If, for example, quantified uncertainties that
arise from insuﬃcient knowledge on the
input parameters were the only uncertainties
we had to deal with, common probabilistic
decision criteria like utility maximization
could be applied in a straightforward way.
Unquantified uncertainties, however, that
arise from insuﬃcient understanding of the
model conceptualization pose a severe prob-
lem. Quantitative figures may be mislead-
ing, but they can be communicated easily to
people outside one's own discipline.This is
not the same for errors and shortcomings
that are not quantified. Nonetheless, in esti-
mating the reliability of a physical or econom-
ic model there always remain unquantified
factors that are hard to communicate. For
example, the outputs of statistical analysis
will always depend on the specific experi-
mental paradigm in use, accepted practices,
and the general research experience within
the field; these factors cannot be defined ex-
plicitly, but must be learned by working in
the field. In this way the scientific commu-
nity establishes a Wittgensteinian language
community.11 Even if scientists in a given
field tend to assign ‘higher order beliefs’ that
express their confidence in an underlying
theory, the methodology used, the researcher
or the group who carried out the work, etc,
these higher-order beliefs are only very rare-
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ly quantifiable themselves in terms of, say,
subjective probabilities.
The precautionary principle and justice as
fairness
When outcomes are highly uncertain, it is
often suggested that we fall back on the pre-
cautionary principle.The phrase precaution-
ary principle is fraught with ambiguity, so let
us briefly explicate the term and its use with-
in ethical, juridical, and political contexts.
The Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, for example, formulates the
precautionary principle (rather vaguely) as
follows: “Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-eﬀective measures to pre-
vent environmental degradation.”12
In this weak formulation, the precautionary
principle provides no distinct directive for
practical decision making. Instead it consti-
tutes a meta-criterion stating that uncer-
tainties in scientific forecasts have to be
taken seriously. Strong formulations of the
precautionary principle constitute a genuine
decision criterion. The following is an ex-
ample of the precautionary principle in a
strong formulation: “Where an activity
raises threats of harm to the environment or
human health, precautionary measures
should be taken if some cause and eﬀect rela-
tionships are not fully established scientifi-
cally [my italics].”13
Proponents of the precautionary principle
like C. Raﬀensberger and J. Tickner suggest
the following core idea behind all formula-
tions of the precautionary principle: “In its
simplest formulation, the precautionary
principle has a dual trigger: If there is a po-
tential for harm from an activity and if there
is uncertainty about the magnitude of im-
pacts or causality, then anticipatory action
should be taken to avoid harm.”14
In this paper, I want to understand the pre-
cautionary principle as a genuine decision
making criterion, that, loosely following
Gardiner,15 interprets the strong formulation
as a variant of the minimax rule in decision
theory: Minimize the maximally bad out-
come. Given certain assumptions about how
to quantify harm and wellbeing, this may be
reformulated as a maximin rule and reads
(for climate change): Maximize wellbeing in
those scenarios in which the involved hu-
mans are worst oﬀ (minimally benefited), re-
gardless of how uncertain these scenarios are.
At first glance, a precautionary approach
seems well suited to avoiding an ethically
unjustifiable discounting of future damage
caused by our present greenhouse gas emis-
sions: We cannot exclude with certainty the
possibility that the release of greenhouse
gases has the potential to cause severe harm
to future generations, hence emissions of
greenhouse gases ought to be abandoned. A
precautionary approach seems adequate
when the stakes are high – the living condi-
tions of all future humans may be endan-
gered by severe climatic changes. Furthermore,
some economic assessments suggest that re-
ducing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emis-
sions is not very costly.16 Following Stern,17
a commitment of only 1 percent of global
gross domestic product (GDP) is needed to
avoid the major hazards that may arise from
climate change. At first blush, this appears
very aﬀordable; but if we base our calcula-
tion on current GDP value, it amounts to
an investment of US $ 450 billion per year.
For comparison: the current estimates of the
money needed to provide 80 percent of rural
populations in Africa with access to water
and sanitation by 2015 amounts to US $ 1.3
billion per annum.18 Clearly, societies (or
other organisations) are able to part with
only a certain amount of money or other re-
sources for altruistic endeavours, and themiti-
gation of major changes in future climate is
only one such endeavour.19 Investing in the
mitigation of climate-change eﬀects means
forgoing other investments which we have a
moral obligation to make. One central re-
quirement of the practical debate is a deci-
sion about which investment has priority
over others. Presupposing an answer to this
question from the very beginning of the de-
bate – for example by assuming that climate
change is currently humanity’s most pressing
problem – pre-empts the moral debate, as
discussed in section 2. Applying the precau-
tionary principle to global warming as a sin-
gular problem thus does not allow us to
adequately deal with the valid claims of
groups that are adversely aﬀected by natural
or societal ‘disasters’ other than climate
change.This approach is clearly incapable of
adequately incorporating considerations of
inter- or intragenerational justice as it does
not address the question of why suﬀering
arising from climate change has priority over
suﬀering caused by other sources.The cri-
tique raised here, however, is not a charge
Intergenerational Justice Review
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against the precautionary principle itself; it
only disqualifies common applications of
the precautionary principle.
Suppose that one can show that – given cer-
tain ethical standards, which are not under
debate here – the worst-case scenario regard-
ing the eﬀects of climate change is that these
eﬀects are worse than any other type of
human suﬀering, present and future. This
means that if our (possibly very unrealistic)
assumptions are indeed correct, then follow-
ing the precautionary principle, we have to
mitigate climate change at any cost. We are
trading the certain suﬀering of people living
presently against a possibly more severe, but
yet uncertain suﬀering of people living in
the future. If the worst-case scenario is as un-
certain as currently estimated for global warm-
ing, and is balanced against certain other
scenarios whose bad eﬀects are certain (like
the actual suﬀering of many people in third
word countries, for example), it is unreason-
able to completely mask all other scenarios
and focus on mitigation of the uncertain,
but worst outcome.20 As noted above, the
available information on the eﬀects of an-
thropogenic global warming includes infor-
mation about the ‘likelihood’ of the
worst-case and other scenarios.This infor-
mation is not quantified and may not be
fully quantifiable at all. However, we do
have information that suggests that, while
present suﬀering is certain, future suﬀering
caused by global warming is uncertain.
Good arguments for neglecting this infor-
mation should be given. But to the best of
the author's knowledge, no such arguments
have been presented tin the literature.
Problems with a precautionary approach as
an action guiding principle have been dis-
cussed extensively in the literature.21 This
paper only addresses one central issue of im-
portance in any intergenerational ethics,
namely how to balance obligations towards
future generations against obligations to-
wards people living presently. Even if one ar-
gues for the ethical legitimacy of trade-oﬀs
between losses and gains experienced by dif-
ferent people one cannot deny that presently
living people have a right to safe water and
suﬃcient nutrition. One needs to argue at
least that uncertain future losses are worse
than current suﬀering. But a mere precau-
tionary approach to global warming is
incapable of simultaneously incorporating
considerations of inter- and intrageneratio-
nal justice.
A modified expected utility approach for
a greener future
The precautionary principle is often perceived
as the opposite e of maximizing expected uti-
lity: Instead of focusing on the worst case sce-
nario, the latter considers all possible outcomes
and the associated utilities , weighted by
their occurrence probability , or, to put it
in more technical terms:We are to maximize
and sum over all possible scenarios.The ex-
treme scenarios of run-away climate change
or very little temperature change, for example,
are thus taken into account, as is the sce-
nario in which the temperature change
exactly equals the estimated mean value.The
latter scenario being the most probable, is
given the greatest weight.
Maximizing the expected utility is an adap-
tation of the utilitarian maxim of the greatest
good for the greatest number to decisions
under uncertainty: It is not the overall utility
(or ‘good’) that is to be maximized, but the
expected utility, i.e. the sum of diﬀerent util-
ities weighted by their probability of occur-
rence.The assignment of utilities to possible
climate-change eﬀects raises many diﬃcult
problems, but I do not want to dwell on
these problems here.These problems are not
specific to decision making under uncer-
tainty and related problems of welfare-based
ethics. Note, in particular, that problems
about determining the utility of an event, or
deciding what utility actually amounts to,
parallel to some extend a problem of the pre-
cautionary approach, i.e. to decide as to how
to actually determine the worst-case sce-
nario.22 As this paper’s focus is on uncer-
tainties (of expected utility and of the
worst-case scenario), the problems associa-
ted with measuring human welfare and how
to equate it with utilities are not discussed
here. For the purposes of this paper it suﬃ-
ces to assume that the impact on human
welfare estimated in economic models on
level three in figure 1 can be associated with
(intersubjective) utilities in a meaningful
way.23
In order to apply the principle that tells us to
maximize expected utility to global warm-
ing, all (morally) relevant eﬀects of green-
house gas emissions have to be assigned
some probability . As there are no fre-
quency estimates for most of these eﬀects,
one may fall back on a Bayesian account, i.e.
via subjective probabilities, the reliability of
scientific outcomes is quantified. The dis-
tinction between quantified and unquanti-
fied uncertainties thus becomes obsolete.
That is rather brief, so let us dilate somewhat
on the problem here: Our most successful
method for tackling uncertainty has been to
regiment situations of uncertainty by the use
of probabilistic propositions. But unless one
is a certain kind of subjectivist about prob-
ability, one wishes that one’s probabilistic be-
liefs are constrained by objective facts, so
that they approximate to objective variables,
whether one takes the latter to be frequen-
cies, propensities, or some other concept.
As argued above and elsewhere,24 there is no
reliable basis for assigning probabilities to
the empirical inputs needed for practical as-
sessment. Unquantified uncertainties are of
central relevance when we are discussing cli-
mate-change issues. This distinguishes the
threat of global warming from other ethical
problems related to energy supply and de-
mand, such as safety issues of nuclear power
plants, or final disposal site, where there is a
reliable basis of assigning probabilities. Not
only is it impossible to choose meaningful
prior probabilities, but due to the large time
scales in which the climate system reacts to
changes, there is also insuﬃcient data for up-
dating these probabilities.The Bayesianmeth-
od of assigning subjective probabilities via
prior guesses therefore fails in the case of cli-
mate change.
Another way to assign subjective probabil-
ities is to use Laplace’s principle of insuﬃ-
cient reason: All possible eﬀects are taken as
equally probable.This approach, which was
employed, for example, by Harsanyi,25 is at
fault for neglecting available empirical in-
formation (as is the precautionary ap-
proach). There is no logical superiority of
Harsanyi’s assumption of equiprobability
over Rawls' focus on the worst outcome as,
per se, there is no logical need to assign sub-
jective probabilities to uncertain decision
outcomes on the basis of Harsanyi’s equi-
probability assumption. We do have infor-
mation – albeit not fully quantified – about
the likelihood of certain eﬀects of climate
change. Hence, even when we leave prob-
lems associated with assigning meaningful
utilities to the impacts of various energy sce-
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narios aside, climate change cannot be trea-
ted by expected utility maximization.This is
unfortunate as maximizing expected utility
has one clear advantage over a precautionary
approach: By incorporating an inter-tempo-
ral as well as an international perspective,
maximizing expected utility is, by its very
nature, able to trade-oﬀ the costs and bene-
fits of diﬀerent people living at diﬀerent
places and times.
The lack of (subjective) probabilities in the
sense defined above does not imply, how-
ever, that one has to fall back on to non-
probabilistic decision criteria such as the
precautionary approach.This paper’s propo-
sition should not be misunderstood as a
kind of reformulation of the precautionary
principle in its weak form, i.e. ‘Take uncer-
tainties seriously and therefore address also
the uncertain outcomes’. If anything, the
paper aimed to argue that uncertain eﬀects
are not to be (mis)taken as certain ones,
which seriously undermines the use of the
precautionary principle.
In the literature decision methods are sug-
gested, which parallel expected utility max-
imization, to cope with the lack of reliable
prior probabilities and information about
how to update these priors on the basis of
the conditional probability calculus.26 An
adequate decision procedure for global war-
ming would assign meaningful utilities to
various outcomes in a first step by political
decisionmakers, moral philosophers and oth-
ers. As to the occurrence of unquantified un-
certainties, however, the second step, the
actual cost-benefit analysis (understood in a
broad sense), should be conducted by ex-
perts on the empirical forecasts. Such a blue
print can only work when, though philo-
sophical ethics may not aim at a detailed
casuistic, it does not shy away from context-
variant information on the very decision.
The 1970s debate on the ‘rationality’ of ex-
pected utility maximization or maximin,
whose main protagonists were Harsanyi and
Rawls, was only able to show that answering
the question of whether the precautionary
principle or expected utility maximization is
adequate has to, willy-nilly, implement con-
text-variant features of the decision situa-
tion. Note that this paper argues against the
precautionary principle only when applied
to global warming.The given arguments do
not discredit this principle as a decision-ma-
king criteria in itself.
Concerning an adequate decision-making
approach to global warming, this paper has,
so far, turned a blind eye to factors that ac-
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tually precede the debate on whether the
precautionary approach or expected utility
measures seem most adequate. So, conclud-
ing this paper, let me briefly discuss this prob-
lem: Before being able to actually talk about
uncertain outcomes of the decision whether
to try to reduce greenhouse gases, we have
to decide what this decision is actually about
– is it about the welfare of future humans?;
do we need to discuss the pros and cons of
alternative energy supplies that do not emit
greenhouse gases as well?, etc. Any analysis
of a specific decision must start with some
delimitation of the decision itself. It is not
always well established how to determine the
‘decision horizon’.27 The scope of the deci-
sion, or even which problem the decision is
supposed to solve might be unclear. The
further in time the consequences of our de-
cisions lie, the more diﬃcult it is to deter-
mine the decision horizon. For example, on
moral grounds diﬀerent people are not to be
treated in a diﬀerent way, but we cannot
simply be all treated in the same way. Cur-
rently, the decision horizon is set by prag-
matic considerations, though, particularly in
intergenerational ethics, it is of central rele-
vance. As for how to determine the scope of
a decision, whether it be about climate
change issues or other issues, this should be
a topic for the empirical sciences, only inso-
far as these determine limits to our
knowledge. It remains a genuine task for eth-
ics that philosophers should not shy away
from, because this task requires dwelling in
detail, on the context of the decision-mak-
ing situation.
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14. Raﬀensberger/Tickner 1999, 1. 15.
Gardiner 2006b.
16. Note that there is considerable disagree-
ment within the economic community on
the costs of reducing greenhouse gases,see
the response ofWeitzmann 2009 and Nord-
haus 2008 to Stern 2007.
17. Stern 2007.
18. Martinez Austria/van Hofwegen (eds.)
2006.
19. Note that the assumption of one well-
defined decision maker that underlies the
debates on climate change and is adopted
here is unrealistic.
20. Note that this argumentation needs re-
finement when the worst-case outcome is a
singular event like the end of human life on
Earth (c.p. Ord/Hillerbrand/Sandberg
2009). The current empirical knowledge,
however, seems to exclude that climate
change is of this very nature.
21. Peterson 2006, Clarke 2005, and ref-
erences therein.
22.The problem of the precautionary ap-
proach is somehow easier, as it needs only an
ordinal concept of wellbeing, while EUT
presupposes a cardinal welfare measure. Car-
dinal and ordinal measures can only identi-
cal when the welfare function already fulfills
certain restraints Neuman/Morgenstern
1967.23. How to actually assign meaning-
ful utilities has been discussed extensively in
the literature. For an intergenerational ethics
it raises rampant problems, see Lumer 2002
for a discussion as to how assign utilities in
the context of climate change.
24. Frame et al. 2007.
25. Harsanyi 1975, 1982.
26. For example Shafer 1990.
27. Hansson 1996, 371.
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